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NOTE
A NARROW ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY FOR
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS: RECONCILING THE
ARM OF THE STATE DOCTRINE WITH
FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES
INTRODUCTION
The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that federal jurisdiction does not extend to suits by private parties against
the state.' This is so even when the state is not the party of record,
provided that the state is the real party in interest. 2 Thus, the amend-
ment may bar a suit against a state officer' or an apparently local govern-
mental entity.4
1. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although the language of the amendment
only bars federal jurisdiction over suits by a citizen of a foreign state or nation, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that the eleventh amendment bars suits by a citizen
against his own state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); see Employees v.
Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973); Parden v. Terminal
Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
2. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 326, 373, 377 (1824),
Chief Justice Marshall construed the eleventh amendment as barring suit only when the
state was the party of record. The Chief Justice, however, later recanted and held that
the eleventh amendment barred a suit against the Governor of Georgia. See Governor of
Ga. v. Sundry Afr. Slaves, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 84, 93-94 (1828). Courts thereafter have ap-
plied the eleventh amendment whenever the state is the real party in interest. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas-
ury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505-06 (1887); Ronwin v.
Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 1981); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519
F.2d 273, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1975); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr.
Fund, 493 F.2d 177, 179-80 (Ist Cir. 1974).
3. See e.g., Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982) (reaffirming the holding in
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937), that the eleventh amendment
bars suits against state officers unless the officials are alleged to be acting against federal
or state law); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974) (eleventh amendment bars
suits against state officials that seek retroactive monetary relief that will be paid with state
funds); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462-64 (1945) (elev-
enth amendment bars action against state officials when it seeks a monetary recovery
from the state).
4. See, eg., Morris v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 224-28 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (eleventh amendment extends to Washington Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity); Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1407 (10th Cir. 1985) (eleventh amend-
ment protects local school board), cert denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986)
(No. 85-1728); Stones v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 572 F. Supp. 1072, 1078
(C.D. Cal. 1983) (community college district entitled to eleventh amendment protection),
aff'd on other grounds, 796 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1986); cf. Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230,
233-34 (7th Cir. 1978) (director of Cook County Department of Public Aid, as an officer
of an arm of state government, entitled to eleventh amendment protection).
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Eleventh amendment immunity has drawn criticism as being undemo-
cratic,5 anachronistic6 and contrary to the constitutional principle of the
supremacy of federal law.7 Hence, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court has created several exceptions to the eleventh amendment bar.'
One such exception is the "arm of the state doctrine," which distin-
guishes between political subdivisions and arms of the state.9 A political
subdivision is a local governmental entity that is in some ways distinct
from the state,' 0 but that nevertheless exercises a "slice of state power." ''
Although suits against a political subdivision implicate the state's sover-
eign power,' 2 a political subdivision has no eleventh amendment immu-
nity.' 3 An arm of the state, by contrast, is a governmental entity that is
5. See Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) ("The Eleventh Amendment .... undoubtedly runs counter to modem demo-
cratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State.").
6. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3178 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (the Supreme Court has used the eleventh amendment to expand aggressively
the scope of sovereign immunity "[i]n an era when sovereign immunity has been gener-
ally recognized ... as an anachronistic and unnecessary remnant of a feudal legal sys-
tem") (citations omitted).
7. See id. at 3154 (eleventh amendment doctrine "is inconsistent with the essential
function of the federal courts-to provide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform
interpretation and enforcement of the supreme law of the land").
8. See id. at 3153-54, 3155 n.8. For a detailed analysis of the exceptions to the
eleventh amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 80-138.
9. See Hall v. Medical College of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 301 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1113 (1985); Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518,
1520 (1 1th Cir. 1983). Courts do not employ uniform terminology. At times courts refer
to the arm of the state doctrine as the "alter ego" inquiry. See Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d
718, 722 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980); Miller-Davis Co. v. Illinois
State Toll Highway Auth., 567 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1977); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519
F.2d 559, 564 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
10. See Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 442
(5th Cir. 1985) (local autonomy indicates that the governmental entity is a political sub-
division), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986); Harden v. Adams, 760 F.2d 1158, 1163
(I I th Cir. 1985) (lack of financial autonomy indicates that the entity is a political subdivi-
sion), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 530 (1985); Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 594
F.2d 489, 493-94 (5th Cir. 1979) (power to levy and collect taxes from which judgments
can be paid indicates that the entity is a political subdivision); Mackey v. Stanton, 586
F.2d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1978) (performance of duties at a local level indicates that the
entity is a political subdivision), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 882 (1979).
11. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
401 (1979); see Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977) (a
local school board is a political subdivision even though it receives a significant amount of
state funding and is subject to some state guidance on educational policies); City of Tren-
ton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1923) (Trenton is a political subdivision of the
state exercising state governmental powers); City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St.
Ry., 196 U.S. 539, 549 (1905) (a municipality exercises a portion of the state's power)
(quoting United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 329 (1873)); see also
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction
of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1099 (1983) (states and their political subdivisions perform similar
governmental functions that deserve similar protections).
12. See supra note 11.
13. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
1986] ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
so closely related to the state that it receives eleventh amendment
protection. 14
Municipalities and counties epitomize the political subdivision.' 5
Other local governmental entities, however, are not as easily catego-
rized.1 6 On two occasions the Supreme Court has relied on a balancing
test to determine whether different entities are instrumentalities of the
state entitled to eleventh amendment immunity, or political subdivisions
subject to suit. 7 The Court, however, has yet to articulate the reason a
political subdivision's embodiment of the state's sovereign power is insuf-
ficient to merit eleventh amendment protection.
Recent Supreme Court developments provide the background for a re-
evaluation of the arm of the state doctrine. In Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman 8 and Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,'9 the
391, 401 (1979); Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977);
Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Hall v. Medical College of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 301 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1113 (1985); Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 583 F.2d 1118, 1121-22 (10th Cir.
1978).
14. See, eg., Fincher v. Florida Dep't of Labor, 798 F.2d 1371, 1371-72 (11th Cir.
1986) (Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission is an arm of the state); Clark v.
Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 743-45 (5th Cir. 1986) (Tarrant County Adult Probation
Department is an arm of the state); Martinez v. Board of Educ., 748 F.2d 1393, 1396
(10th Cir. 1984) (under New Mexico law, local school boards are arms of the state).
15. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 401 (1979) ("[T]he Court has consistently refused to construe the [Eleventh]
Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipal-
ities .... "); Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412, 416-17 (5th Cir.) (eleventh amendment does
not extend to counties), modified on other grounds, 766 F.2d 193 (1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 570 (1985); Hall v. Medical College of Ohio, 742 F.2d 299, 301 (6th Cir. 1984)
(eleventh amendment does not extend to municipalities and counties), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1113 (1985); Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734
F.2d 730, 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (same); Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713
F.2d 1518, 1520 (1lth Cir. 1983) (same); Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 583 F. Supp. 1522, 1524 (D.D.C. 1984) (same), aff'd, 781 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
16. Compare Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1979) (County Depart-
ment of Social Services not entitled to eleventh amendment protection), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 913 (1980) with Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230, 233-34 (7th Cir. 1978) (director of
Cook County Department of Public Aid is an officer of an arm of the state and therefore
benefits from the state's eleventh amendment immunity); Jackson Sawmill Co. v. United
States, 580 F.2d 302, 302, 308 (8th Cir. 1978) (Illinois Toll Highway Authority is a state
agency entitled to eleventh amendment protection), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1070 (1979)
with Miller-Davis Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 567 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir.
1977) (Illinois State Toll Highway Authority not protected by eleventh amendment);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. School Bd. of Dade County, 666 F.2d 505, 507 (11 th Cir.)
(school board not entitled to eleventh amendment protection), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834
(1982) with Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1973)
(school district receives eleventh amendment protection).
17. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 401-02 (1979); Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81
(1977). For a detailed description of the Mount Healthy-Lake Country balancing test see
infra text accompanying notes 28-54.
18. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
19. 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985).
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Court clarified the federalism principles behind two other important ex-
ceptions to the state's eleventh amendment immunity.2" Although these
cases did not rule on any questions concerning the eleventh amendment
immunity of political subdivisions,2' their impact on eleventh amend-
ment doctrine has potentially far reaching ramifications.22
This Note applies federalism principles to the arm of the state doc-
trine, and thereby develops a modified interpretation of the suability of
political subdivisions that protects the state's sovereignty without inter-
fering with the federal judiciary's role in interpreting and enforcing the
protections of federal law. Part I reviews the Supreme Court cases on
political subdivisions and demonstrates that political subdivisions possess
elements of state sovereignty. Part II undertakes an analysis of eleventh
amendment doctrine and concludes that exceptions to the eleventh
amendment generally apply only when federally protected rights are at
stake. In this way the eleventh amendment minimizes the infringement
on state sovereignty. The arm of the state doctrine, however, applies
even when federally protected rights are not at stake. Part III concludes
that the arm of the state doctrine also should be narrowly tailored to
assure the vindication of federally secured rights with minimal infringe-
ment on the state's sovereignty. Accordingly, this Note concludes that
political subdivisions should receive eleventh amendment protection
from actions that do not raise substantive questions of federal law.
I. THE STATE AND ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
The Supreme Court has decided only three cases on the eleventh
amendment immunity of political subdivisions. The first case, Lincoln
County v. Luning,2 was a diversity action.24 Plaintiffs, citizens of Cali-
fornia and Germany, brought suit in federal circuit court alleging that
the defendant, Lincoln County, Nevada, had failed to make payments on
20. Id. at 3147-48 (abrogation of the eleventh amendment); Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-06 (1984) (injunctions against state officers). For a
detailed discussion of these exceptions see infra text accompanying notes 102-29.
21. In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether relief could
be granted against the defendant county officials on the basis of state law alone. 465 U.S.
at 123-24. The Court, however, did not decide the issue of the county officials' eleventh
amendment immunity. Id. at 123-24 n.34. Instead, the Court dismissed the action
against the county officials on the ground that any relief granted against them could not
be justified under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction since such relief would be only
partial and incomplete. Id. at 124. The Court concluded that such ineffective enforce-
ment of state law would not advance the policies of efficiency, convenience and fairness
that support the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Id. Nevertheless, the Court indicated
that if faced with the eleventh amendment question, it might be willing to grant eleventh
amendment protection to county officials when the judgment would require payments
from the state treasury. See id. at 123-24 n.34.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 133-59.
23. 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
24. See Vincent v. Lincoln County, 30 F. 749, 749 (C.C.D. Nev. 1887) (action for
amount due on county bonds issued pursuant to a state statute), aff'd sub nom. Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 533-34 (1890).
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its bonds.2 5 The County challenged the court's jurisdiction, contending
that the County was an integral part of the state and therefore was under
the eleventh amendment's umbrella.26 The Supreme Court, however,
ruled that because the County was a corporate entity, its relationship to
the state was too remote to afford eleventh amendment protection.27
Lincoln County stood for eighty-six years as the sole Supreme Court
ruling on the eleventh amendment immunity of political subdivisions. In
1977, the Court broke its silence with Mount Healthy City School District
v. Doyle.2" In contrast to Lincoln County, Mount Healthy was based on
federal question jurisdiction.2 9 The plaintiff, an untenured teacher,
claimed that the School Board's refusal to rehire him violated his first
and fourteenth amendment rights.3" The District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio found that the state had waived its immunity"' and the
Sixth Circuit affirmed.32 The Supreme Court, however, considered the
issue of waiver secondary to the threshold question of whether the School
Board was "an arm of the State partaking of the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity," or a "political subdivision to which the Elev-
enth Amendment does not extend." 3 In making this determination the
Court looked to the nature of the entity under state law as evidenced by a
balance of three factors: (1) whether state law categorized the School
Board as an independent entity; (2) the degree to which the state con-
trolled the Board's policies; and (3) the degree of state funding relative to
the Board's power to raise its own funds. 34 The Court found that under
state law the Board was an independent entity with extensive powers to
issue bonds and levy taxes.35 Thus, despite a significant level of state
funding and some state control over board policies, the Court concluded
that the state's eleventh amendment immunity did not extend to the
School Board.36
The Court returned to the political subdivision question in Lake Coun-
try Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. a7 Like Mount
Healthy, Lake Country also arose under the Court's federal question ju-
risdiction." Tahoe area property owners claimed that the Tahoe Plan-
25. Id.
26. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
27. Id.
28. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
29. Id. at 276-77.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 279-80.
32. Id. at 276. The circuit court affirmed without opinion. See Doyle v. Mount
Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 524 (1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 274
(1977).
33. 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
34. See id. at 280-81.
35. Id. at 280.
36. Id. at 280-81.
37. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
38. Id. at 395-96.
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ning Agency, an interstate agency created by compact between California
and Nevada, was following policies that had destroyed their property in
violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 9 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the eleventh amendment protected
the agency from suit in federal court.4 ° The Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the agency did not enjoy the special constitutional protection
of the states.4 The Court again employed the Mount Healthy balancing
test,42 but identified four new factors: (1) express provisions allocating
responsibility for judgments; (2) the ratio of state to local members on
the agency's governing board; (3) whether the entity's primary functions
are traditionally state or local; and (4) the history of litigation between
the state and the entity.43
Viewed together, Lake Country and Mount Healthy identify two sub-
sets of factors relevant to the definition of a political subdivision.44 The
first subset relates to whether the state, in creating the entity, intends that
the entity partake of the state's immunity.45 This grouping includes the
state's categorization of the entity as either an independent entity or an
arm of the state,46 and the state's litigation behavior toward the entity.47
The second subset relates to whether the structure of the entity and its
relationship to the state indicate that the entity exercises policy-making
powers free from state control.48 Express provisions making the state
liable for judgments against the entity49 and extensive state funding
evince state control.50 By contrast, an entity's authority to levy taxes and
issue bonds without obligating the state indicates that the entity is
independent. 5'
39. Id. at 394-95.
40. Id. at 396. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Tahoe Regional Planning Au-
thority was an agency of the compacting states and therefore immune from suits brought
without their consent. Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353,
1359-60 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). The court noted that the
interstate compact creating the planning authority referred to the planning authority as a
political subdivision of both compacting states for the purposes of suit. Id. at 1362. Nev-
ertheless, the court concluded that this provision did not amount to a waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity. Id.
41. 440 U.S. 391, 402 (1979).
42. See id. at 400-01 & n.19.
43. See id. at 401-02.
44. See Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 224-28
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (grouping the Mount Healthy-Lake Country criteria into indicia of pur-
pose and structure).
45. See id. at 224-25.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 225-28.
49. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 402 (1979).
50. See Morris v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 225-27
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
51. See id. at 226.
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These cases reveal that under the Supreme Court's balancing test a
political subdivision may be independent from the state in some respects,
while in other respects it may embody the state's sovereignty. 52 For ex-
ample, in Mount Healthy the Court ruled that the School Board was a
political subdivision even though it was subject to some state control,
both directly through general state supervision of policy, and indirectly
through dependence on a significant amount of state funding. 3 The Sec-
ond Circuit, applying the Mount Healthy-Lake Country balancing test,
found a governmental entity to be a political subdivision even though the
state controlled the policies of the entity, and the acts giving rise to the
suit against the entity were conducted pursuant to a state mandate.54
These cases illustrate that suits against a political subdivision can offend
the state's sovereignty.
Other Supreme Court cases have concluded that political subdivisions
exercise state power in performing their local governmental functions. 5
Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the acts of a
political subdivision are state acts for purposes of the contracts clause,56
the equal protection clause, 57 the due process clause5" and the Bill of
Rights as incorporated through the fourteenth amendment. 9 Thus, the
present doctrine creates an apparent contradiction: a political subdivi-
52. See supra notes 10 & 11.
53. 429 U.S. at 280-81.
54. Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 643-45 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913
(1980). In Holley, the county social service district denied plaintiff Holley a portion of
the benefits she had been receiving under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program. Id. at 640-41. In denying plaintiff these benefits the social service district was
carrying out the provisions of section 131-k of the New York Social Services Law. Id.
at 641 & n.2.
55. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1923) (City of Trenton
exercises governmental powers of the state); City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St.
Ry., 196 U.S. 539, 549 (1904) ("[A] municipal corporation is not only a part of the State
but is a portion of its governmental power. 'It is one of its creatures, made for a specific
purpose, to exercise within a limited sphere the powers of the State.' ") (quoting United
States v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 329 (1873)); Railroad Co. v. County of
Otoe, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 667, 676 (1872) ("Counties, cities and towns .... are instru-
ments of the State, created to carry out its will.... [The State through them... [does]
indirectly what it might do directly.").
56. See, eg., Northern Pac. Ry. v. Minnesota e-x rel. Duluth, 208 U.S. 583, 590
(1908); Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. v. City of Columbus, 203 U.S. 311, 320 (1906);
Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 216-17 (1903); St. Paul Gas
Light Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1901).
57. See, e-g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-24 (1961); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1958).
58. See, eg., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 506 (1977); Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974); Thompson v. City of Louis-
ville, 362 U.S. 199, 199, 206 (1960).
59. See, eg., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-36 (1985) (fourth amendment
restrictions apply to school officials); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978) (fire-
men subject to restrictions of fourth amendment); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commu-
nity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (school officials subject to restrictions of first
amendment); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 541, 546 (1967) (city ordinance violated
the fourth amendment); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (city ordinance
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sion is charged with the responsibilities of a sovereign state for purposes
of the state action doctrine, yet is denied the state's mantle of immunity
for purposes of the eleventh amendment.6° To date, however, the
Supreme Court has neither justified this contradiction, nor protected the
state from the infringement on state sovereignty that suits against polit-
ical subdivisions permit.
Recent Supreme Court cases have relied on the federalism concerns
underlying the eleventh amendment to limit other eleventh amendment
exceptions to situations involving issues of federal law. 6' Part II of this
Note suggests that courts can resolve the inconsistencies in the arm of
the state doctrine by extending the same federalism principles to suits
against political subdivisions.
II. FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES BEHIND THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the eleventh amendment
imposes the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity as a limit on
the grant of judicial authority in article III of the Constitution.62 To a
degree, however, this interpretation is inconsistent with the essential
function of the federal courts in the interpretation and enforcement of
federal law.63 For this reason, sovereign immunity generally, and the
eleventh amendment specifically, have been criticized as undemocratic'
and anachronistic. 65
Seeking to balance the tension between federal concerns and state soy-
violated first amendment); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
637-38 (1943) (Bill of Rights applies to boards of education).
60. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12 (1974); Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City
of Akron, No. 86-3191, slip op. at 12 n.3 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1986); Holley v. Lavine, 605
F.2d 638, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980); Rhode Island Affiliate
ACLU, Inc. v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm'n, 553 F. Supp. 752, 768 (D.R.I. 1982);
Dyson v. Lavery, 417 F. Supp. 103, 107 (E.D. Va. 1976).
61. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3145-46 (1985) (the doc-
trines of waiver and abrogation, two well established exceptions to the eleventh amend-
ment, must be construed narrowly to maintain "the fundamental constitutional balance
between the Federal Government and the States"); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-06 (1984) (the doctrine of Ex parte Young, which permits
federal courts to award prospective injunctive relief against state officers whose official
acts violate the Constitution, balances the need to vindicate federal rights against the
eleventh amendment immunity of the states).
62. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3145 (1985) ("[T]he sig-
nificance of [the Eleventh] Amendment 'lies in its affirmation that the fundamental prin-
ciple of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Article III' of the
Constitution.") (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98
(1984)); cf Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (eleventh amendment is but an
exemplification of the fundamental rule of jurisprudence that a state may not be sued
without its consent).
63. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3154 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
64. See supra note 5.
65. See supra note 6.
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ereign immunity, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the elev-
enth amendment, 66 of which the arm of the state doctrine is one.67 The
key to understanding the purpose of the arm of the state doctrine lies in
understanding the role it plays in striking a balance between competing
state and federal interests. This, in turn, requires a thorough analysis of
eleventh amendment doctrine.
A. The General Rule: The Eleventh Amendment Embodies State
Sovereign Immunity
Relying on the precept that the eleventh amendment embodies state
sovereign immunity, the Court has construed the amendment liberally.68
This construction often has resulted in the extension of eleventh amend-
66. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3145-46 (1985); id. at
3154, 3155 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the Supreme Court's eleventh amendment doc-
trine of state sovereign immunity "has led to the development of a complex body of
technical rules made necessary by the need to circumvent the intolerable constriction of
federal jurisdiction that would otherwise occur"); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984) (the Exparte Young doctrine is an important excep-
tion to the eleventh amendment immunity of the state); see also C. Jacobs, The Eleventh
Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 155 (Contributions in American History No. 19,
1972) (the tension between sovereign immunity and fundamental constitutional precepts
accounts for the inconsistencies in eleventh amendment doctrine); Baker, Federalism and
the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. Colo. L. Rev. 139, 158-66 (1977) (although eleventh
amendment embodies aspects of sovereign immunity, eleventh amendment doctrine di-
verges from the principles of sovereign immunity as is necessary to promote federalism);
Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment af-
ter Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 Hastings Const. L.Q. 643, 643 (1985) (although eleventh
amendment doctrine tends to immunize state governments from federal jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has developed a number of ways to circumvent this broad immunity
when necessary to enforce the Constitution and federal laws); Note, The Limits of Fed-
eral Judicial Power over the States: The Eleventh Amendment and Pennhurst II, 26
B.C.L. Rev. 947, 956-63 (1985) [hereinafter Limits of Federal Judicial Power] (Supreme
Court interpretation of the eleventh amendment reflects a tension between state auton-
omy and federal supremacy).
67. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3155 n.8 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (although Justice Brennan did not use the arm of the state terminol-
ogy, he stated that the rule permitting suits against local governmental units "permit[s]
suits that would appear to be barred by any thoroughgoing interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment as a bar to exercise of the federal judicial power in suits against states");
Comment, The Denial of Eleventh Amendment Immunity to Political Subdivisions of the
States: An Unjustified Strain on Federalism, 1979 Duke L.J. 1042, 1042-49 (describing
the denial of eleventh amendment immunity to political subdivisions as an exception).
68. See C. Jacobs, supra note 66, at 107-10 (discussing expansive Supreme Court in-
terpretation of the eleventh amendment to provide for state sovereign immunity); Baker,
supra note 66, at 153-62 (by interpreting the eleventh amendment as a bar to a suit by
citizens against their own states. the Supreme Court goes beyond the text of the amend-
ment to preserve the states' traditional immunity); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 522 (1978) (since
the courts conclude that all state sovereign immunity derives from the eleventh amend-
ment, they occasionally state that the only way to effectuate the amendment is to disre-
gard its express language); Limnits of Federal Judicial Power, supra note 66, at 961 (courts
have interpreted the eleventh amendment as a broad grant of state sovereign immunity,
which extends beyond the literal terms of the amendment).
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ment protection far beyond the amendment's restrictive language. For
instance, although the language of the amendment only bars suits in law
or equity brought by citizens of another state or by foreign citizens or
subjects,69 the Court has held that the eleventh amendment protects a
state from suits in admiralty,7" suits by a foreign state,7' and suits by its
own citizens.7
2
The doctrine of waiver also illustrates this liberal construction. The
language of the eleventh amendment is clearly jurisdictional: by its terms
it withdraws jurisdiction that article III expressly grants to federal
courts.7 3 Federal courts, as courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction,
may not exceed this jurisdiction even upon the request of the parties.74
Nevertheless, as with sovereign immunity,75 the Supreme Court permits
the states to waive their eleventh amendment immunity and consent to
suit in federal court.76 A state may waive its immunity by statute or by
constitutional provision.77 The Court, however, will find a waiver only
when indicated by "express language" or "overwhelming implications
69. See supra note 1.
70. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 498 (1921); see generally Fletcher, supra
note 11, at 1078-83 (tracing the history of federal jurisdiction over admiralty suits against
states).
71. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 320-21, 330 (1934).
72. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Employees v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184,
186 (1964); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944); Duhne v. New Jersey,
251 U.S. 311, 313 (1920); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1890).
73. Article III, § 2, cl. 1 reads in pertinent part: "The judicial Power shall extend...
to Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State ... and between a
State ... and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." The eleventh amendment parallels
this language: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." See Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3170 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(remarking on the "congruence of language"). The Court has recognized "that the Elev-
enth Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that
it need not be raised in the trial court." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974); C.
Jacobs, supra note 66, at 107.
74. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975); American Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 & n.17 (1951); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149, 152 (1908); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 382 (1902); Byers v. McAuley,
149 U.S. 608, 618 (1893); Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379,
384 (1884); Giannakos v. M/V Bravo Trader, 762 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985); Ap-
pleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 976 (1981).
75. It is a longstanding principle that a sovereign may waive its immunity and con-
sent to suit. See Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 207, 252 (1837); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 120, 171 (1821); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D.
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 131, at 1043 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
Prosser & Keeton]; Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2-9 (1963) (discussing the early English legal principles governing the
King's consent to suit).
76. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3145 & n.! (1985); Clark
v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883).
77. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3145 n.l (1985).
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from the text." 8 Participation in a federally funded program also can
effectuate a waiver, but only when the appropriating statute clearly con-
ditions participation in the program on a state's consent to suit in federal
court.7 9 Not suprisingly, these rules severely restrict the number of
waivers.
B. Exceptions to State Sovereign Immunity
Despite this broad interpretation of the eleventh amendment, the
Court has long recognized the need for exceptions when federally pro-
tected rights are at stake. These exceptions have grown concurrently
with the growth of federal question jurisdiction.
1. Appellate Jurisdiction
Although article III gives Congress the power to grant federal courts
original jurisdiction over suits presenting a federal question," Congress
did not create federal question jurisdiction until 1875.81 Prior to that
date most original federal question jurisdiction lay exclusively with the
78. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distil-
ling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)); see also Great N. Life Ins. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54
(1944) (waiver requires "a clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation") (footnote omitted).
79. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3150 (1985); Florida
Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1974).
80. Article III provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish....
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ....
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction ....
U.S. Const. art. III §§ 1-3. The grant of jurisdiction in cases "arising under" the Consti-
tution, laws and treaties of the United States is generally referred to as federal question
jurisdiction. See C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 17, at 90 (4th ed. 1983).
Although the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is self-executing, id. at 33, article
III does not grant the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in federal question cases.
Under article III, only the congressionally ordained "inferior Courts" may exercise origi-
nal federal question jurisdiction. See U.S. Const. art. III, §§ I & 2. In 1789 Congress
established inferior courts with both appellate and original jurisdiction, but did not confer
original federal question jurisdiction. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. Thus,
the first Congress established the principle that under article III Congress has the discre-
tion to grant or withhold original federal question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
consistently affirmed this principle. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01
(1973); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 453, 461 (1850); Cary v. Curtis,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 265, 277 (1845).
81. See Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Congress previously exer-
cised its power to grant original federal question jurisdiction in 1801, but repealed the
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state courts.82 When federally protected rights were at issue, however,
the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to take appeals from the state court
of last resort.83
The Marshall Court, although not squarely confronting the issue, im-
plied that the eleventh amendment did not bar such appellate jurisdiction
even when the state was the defendant. In Cohens v. Virginia,84 the
Court heard an appeal on a criminal conviction from the highest court of
Virginia." The defendant based his appeal on an act of Congress. 86
Chief Justice Marshall held that the case was within the appellate juris-
diction of the Court as set forth in the "arising under" clause of article
III, section 2 of the Constitution.87 In reaching this conclusion, the
Chief Justice placed great emphasis on the important role of the federal
judiciary in the "preservation of the constitution and the laws of the
United States. ' 88
Justice Marshall then addressed the eleventh amendment issue. After
holding that a criminal defendant's petition for a writ of error was not a
suit "commenced" or "prosecuted" against the state under the terms of
the eleventh amendment, he held in the alternative that the suit was not
within the amendment because it was not brought "by a citizen of an-
other State, or by a citizen or subject of any foreign State."89 Although
Cohens stands for the proposition that the eleventh amendment does not
bar appellate jurisdiction of a suit by a citizen against his state, the Court
did not clarify whether its holding would apply with equal force when
the appeal was brought by a citizen or subject of another state or of a
foreign state.
In Smith v. Reeves,9" the Court again addressed the question of
whether a suit by a citizen against his state was within the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court.9" When Smith reached the Court, how-
ever, it already had been firmly established that the eleventh amendment
applied with equal force to suits by citizens and noncitizens.92 The Court
stated that the state's eleventh amendment immunity was
subject always to the condition, arising out of the supremacy of the
Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance
thereof, that the final judgment of the highest court of the State in any
statute the following year. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of
Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
82. C. Wright, supra note 80, § 1, at 4.
83. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87.
84. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 120 (1821).
85. Id. at 168-69.
86. Id.
87. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 120, 182
(1821).
88. 19 U.S. at 175.
89. Id. at 184-85.
90. 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
91. Id. at 445.
92. See id. at 446-47; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 14-21 (1890).
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action brought against it with its consent may be reviewed or reexam-
ined, as prescribed by the act of Congress, if it denies to the plaintiff
any right, title, privilege or immunity secured to him and specially
claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States.9
The Smith Court had previously concluded that the state's consent to
suit in state court was not a waiver of its eleventh amendment immu-
nity.9 4 Therefore, Smith represents a clear statement of the rule that the
eleventh amendment does not restrict the Supreme Court's appellate ju-
risdiction over suits against the state. Since Smith, the Supreme Court
has exercised appellate jurisdiction over numerous suits by persons seek-
ing to enforce federally protected rights against states.9 5 Nevertheless,
because the states must waive their state law sovereign immunity before a
suit may originate in state court, the states control an individual's ability
to enforce his federally protected rights. This leads to inconsistent and
fortuitous enforcement of federally secured rights.96
In 1875 Congress expanded the original jurisdiction of the federal
courts to include suits presenting questions of federal law. 97 This corre-
sponded to the expansion of federally secured rights through the enact-
ment of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, 98 and the
Civil Rights Statutes of 1871. 9 9 The confluence of new federally pro-
tected rights and increased federal jurisdiction exacerbated the friction
between eleventh amendment immunity and the supremacy of federal
law." It was in the aftermath of these developments that the Court
93. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445 (1900).
94. See id.
95. See e.g., Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465, 2468-69 (1985) (Court adjudi-
cated appeal from a suit against state of Vermont seeking retroactive application of a state
tax credit); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1984) (Court adjudi-
cated appeal from a suit seeking a refund of state taxes from state officials); Summa Corp.
v. California, 466 U.S. 198, 199-201 & n.1 (1984) (Court adjudicated appeal from a suit
against the state of California to determine title to the Ballona Lagoon); Aloha Airlines,
Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 8-11 (1983) (Court adjudicated appeal from a
suit against state officials for a refund of state taxes); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414
U.S. 313, 314-17 (1973) (Court adjudicated appeal from suit against state of Arizona to
quiet title), overruled on other grounds, Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S.
363 (1977).
96. The scope of state law sovereign immunity varies from state to state. Prosser and
Keeton have found that the states fall into four groups. First, two states have retained
total sovereign immunity. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 75, § 131, at 1044. Second,
approximately seven states effectively have abolished the immunity by creating adminis-
trative agencies to hear and determine claims against the state. Id. Third, a group of
nine states have waived their immunity in a limited class of cases, the practical effect of
which is to limit liability to motor vehicle cases. Id. at 1044-45. Fourth, about thirty
states have adopted a general waiver of immunity. Id. at 1045. Consequently, the en-
forcement of federally protected rights in state courts is arbitrary and capricious.
97. See supra note 81.
98. See U.S. Const. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
99. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
100. See generally Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity.
A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889, 1968-2003 (1983) (discussing the conflict
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announced the doctrine of Ex parte Young. °10
2. Ex parte Young: Enjoining State Officers
In Ex parte Young 10 2 the Supreme Court took a crucial step toward
reducing the friction between the principles of the eleventh amendment
and the supremacy of federal law.'"I The case involved a suit by the
stockholders of a group of railroads against the Attorney General of
Minnesota."° The stockholders sought to enjoin the Attorney General
from enforcing a state statute which reduced the rates that railroads
could charge within the state.'0 5 The plaintiffs claimed that in acting
pursuant to the statute the Attorney General had taken their property in
violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the four-
teenth amendment. 0 6 The Attorney General responded that the suit
was in fact a suit against the state, and therefore that the eleventh
amendment barred the action. 07 The Court held that the eleventh
amendment did not bar the suit because the alleged federal law violation
stripped the officer of his official authority, thereby rendering him per-
sonally responsible for his conduct. 08
Justice Harlan issued a vigorous dissent. He argued that the true ob-
ject of the suit was to tie the hands of the state.'0 9 Accordingly, he con-
cluded that the suit was effectively a suit against the state." 0 Although
Ex parte Young is still the rule,"' Justice Harlan's argument clearly
between state and federal interests and its effect on eleventh amendment doctrine between
1875 and 1890).
101. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
102. Id. Some commentators view the Ex parte Young doctrine as an exemplification
of the principles of sovereign immunity. See Baker, supra note 66, at 155-58; Tribe, Inter-
governmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers
Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 687 (1976). This view
emphasizes the similarities between the liability of state officers under Ex parte Young
and the availability of writs against officers under the ancient English doctrine of sover-
eign immunity. See generally Jaffe, supra note 75, at 16-18 (discussing the early English
law of sovereign immunity). While the ancient writ against officers permitted retrospec-
tive money damages against officers to reach the state's treasury, id. at 17-18, relief under
the doctrine of Ex parte Young is much more limited. See infra notes 102-17 and accom-
panying text. Consequently, this Note treats the Exparte Young doctrine as an exception
to the sovereign immunity principles that the eleventh amendment embodies.
103. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)
(" 'Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the princi-
ples of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers se-
cured elsewhere in the Constitution.' ") (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
104. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 129 (1908).
105. See id. at 127-29.
106. See id. at 130-31.
107. See id. at 132.
108. See id. at 159-60.
109. Id. at 173-74.
110. Id. at 174.
111. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1974).
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states the reality: Ex parte Young is a fiction which creates an exception
to the eleventh amendment immunity of the state.' " 2
Subsequent cases have refined the doctrine. It is now clear that Ex
parte Young only applies to suits seeking prospective injunctive relief."I3
Suits for prospective monetary relief are limited to those costs that are
ancillary to the injunction.'14 When a suit against an officer acting in his
official capacity seeks to impose a retroactive liability that must be paid
from state funds, the state is the real party in interest and the officer
partakes of the eleventh amendment immunity." 5 Furthermore, when
the plaintiff relies solely on an alleged state law violation, Ex parte Young
does not apply and the eleventh amendment shields the officer." 6 This
reveals the purpose of the Ex parte Young exception - to allow the fed-
eral courts to vindicate the supremacy of federal law." 7
3. Abrogation
The vindication of the supremacy of federal law is also the impetus
behind the doctrine of abrogation. Under this doctrine, Congress can
override the eleventh amendment when enacting legislation designed to
enforce the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment." 8
Courts will not find an abrogation, however, unless Congress makes "its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."" 9
These rules of interpretation have had severe consequences, as illus-
112. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102, 105 (1984);
C. Wright, supra note 80, § 48, at 289; Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretend-
ing to Sue an Officer, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 436-37 (1962); Limits of Federal Judicial
Power, supra note 66, at 960.
113. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1984);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-67 (1974).
114. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690-92, 695 n.24 (1978) (attorneys' fees
against state not violative of eleventh amendment when ancillary to a prospective order
enforcing federal law); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 295 (1977) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (eleventh amendment does not bar injunctive relief requiring the state
to pay six million dollars to defray the costs of desegregation); see also Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974) (injunction in Ex parte Young had substantial impact on
state's revenues since the injunction prohibited the Attorney General from enforcing
fines).
115. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-68, 678 (1974); see Kentucky v. Graham,
105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105, 3107 (1985).
116. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105-06 (1984).
117. See id. (citing Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 237 (1974); Georgia R.R. & Banking v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304 (1952)); see
also Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by [the Supreme]
Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective
supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.").
118. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3145 (1985); Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
119. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3147 (1985); see Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 342-45 (1979).
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trated by their application to section 1983.120 Section 1983 is perhaps the
most important of all the civil rights statutes' 2' because it provides
sweeping legal and equitable remedies for deprivations of "any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."' 2 2 Nev-
ertheless, in Edelman v. Jordan,23 the Supreme Court concluded that
section 1983 did not abrogate the eleventh amendment. 24 The reason
for this conclusion is not readily apparent from the Edelman opinion. In
the subsequent case of Quern v. Jordan,'25 however, the Court stated
three bases for the Edelman holding. First, section 1983 lacks explicit
language evincing an intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment. 26
Second, the legislative history does not focus directly on the issue of state
liability. 27 Third, denying abrogation does not render section 1983
"meaningless insofar as States are concerned."' 28 Hence, Edelman illus-
trates that abrogation is a very narrow exception to the eleventh amend-
ment which plays only a limited role in securing federally protected
rights. 29
4. The Arm of the State Doctrine
The arm of the state doctrine first received judicial recognition in
1890.130 Its birth coincided with the same intensified frictions between
the eleventh amendment and the supremacy clause that attended the an-
nouncement of Ex parte Young.' 3' Unlike the Ex Parte Young doctrine,
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
121. See C. Wright, supra note 80, § 22A, at 119-21.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
123. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
124. Id. at 674-78. In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-45 (1979), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed this aspect of the Edelman holding.
125. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
126. Id. at 345.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The Supreme Court likewise found the intent to abrogate lacking in § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scan-
Ion, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3147-48 (1985). Nevertheless, other statutes have abrogated the
eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-700 (1978) (Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982))); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) (Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.1-2000e.17 (1982)); David D. v.
Dartmouth School Comm., 775 F.2d 411,420-22 (1st Cir. 1985) (Education of the Hand-
icapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1790 (1986); Heiar
v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1984) (Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982)), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3500 (1985);
Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 714 F.2d 946, 950
(9th Cir. 1983) (Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758
(1982)), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209 (1984).
130. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (although the Court did
not use the arm of the state terminology, it refused to extend eleventh amendment immu-
nity to the county because the county's connection to the state was too remote).
131. Between 1875 and 1890 the Supreme Court struggled with the complex problems
of federalism resulting from the widespread attempts by post-Reconstruction Southern
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the arm of the state doctrine allows a substantial financial recovery
against governmental entities. 3 2
Viewed in light of eleventh amendment doctrine, this potential for fi-
nancial recovery reveals the importance of the arm of the state doctrine.
As a practical matter, under Ex parte Young a governmental entity may
be enjoined any time its officers' actions violate federal law.' 33 A mone-
tary judgment, however, is limited to those costs that are ancillary to
enforcement of the injunction.3 4 Although a plaintiff may win substan-
tial monetary relief in cases of waiver and abrogation, the Court has se-
verely curtailed the availability of these options through strict rules of
legislative interpretation. 135 Further, despite a plaintiff's ability to sue in
state court with the possibility of an appeal to the Supreme Court in the
event of an improper interpretation of federal law,136 access to state
courts is limited to instances in which there is a waiver of state law im-
munity. 137 Consequently, when a monetary remedy is the only effective
relief, federally protected rights often go unenforced and many plaintiffs
are denied justice. 3 s The suability of political subdivisions alleviates this
injustice and helps individuals vindicate their federal rights by allowing
substantial financial recoveries against governmental entities that only
marginally embody the state's sovereignty.
governments to repudiate state bonds issued by their predecessors. See, e.g., Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (attempt by Louisiana to evade bond obligations); Virginia
Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885) (eight cases relating to attempt by Virginia to repudi-
ate validity of bond coupons as payment for taxes); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick
R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883) (attempt by Georgia to repudiate an issue of railroad bonds
indorsed by the state); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882) (attempt by Louisiana to
repudiate certain outstanding obligations); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531
(1875) (attempt by Louisiana to unilaterally reduce the amount of its outstanding public
debt). See generally Gibbons, supra note 100, at 1976-2002 (discussing the problem of
repudiation and its effect on eleventh amendment doctrine). After 1890 the repudiation
issue began to lose its urgency. Id. at 2002. Lincoln County, decided in 1890, and Ex
parte Young, decided in 1908, both followed this extended period of state-federal tension.
132. Under the arm of the state doctrine, political subdivisions do not receive eleventh
amendment protection. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text. Moreover, in Mo-
nell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 & n.54 (1978), the
Court held that political subdivisions are amenable to suits for money damages under
section 1983 when their officers engage in unconstitutional acts pursuant to governmental
custom, or in furtherance of an official governmental policy. See also Minton v. St. Ber-
nard Parish School Bd., No. 85-3688, slip op. at 417 (5th Cir. Oct. 22, 1986) ("Louisiana
school boards . . . are not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity to Section 1983
claims.").
133. See supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 73-79, 118-29 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 75.
138. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3155 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 27.01 (3d ed. 1972) (discussing the
harsh consequences of governmental immunity).
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III. APPLYING FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES TO THE ARM OF THE
STATE DOCTRINE
This overview of eleventh amendment doctrine reveals that, aside from
the arm of the state doctrine, the exceptions to the eleventh amendment
are limited to situations in which federally protected rights are at
stake.' 39 The narrowness of these exceptions assures the balance that
federalism requires.
Mount Healthy and Lake Country involved questions of federal law.' 40
Hence, the application of the arm of the state doctrine in these cases was
consistent with the policy of federalism underlying the Court's eleventh
amendment doctrine. In Lincoln County v. Luning,'4 1 however, the
Supreme Court permitted a suit against a political subdivision despite the
lack of a federal question.'42 Courts have followed Lincoln County and
have continued to distinguish between political subdivisions and arms of
the state regardless of whether jurisdiction is based on diversity of citi-
zenship 143 or federal question.' 44
This practice is contrary to the balance of state and federal interests
that inheres in the Supreme Court's eleventh amendment doctrine. In
cases presenting federal questions, the arm of the state doctrine plays an
important role in maintaining this balance by providing substantial finan-
cial remedies when federal rights are at issue. 4 .5 In a case based solely on
diversity, however, there are no substantive federal rights in need of
protection. 146
Accordingly, political subdivisions should receive eleventh amendment
protection from diversity suits. The primary justification for federal ju-
risdiction in diversity cases is to protect out-of-state citizens from state
139. See supra notes 80-129 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 29-30, 38-39 and accompanying text.
141. 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
142. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435,
437-40 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986); Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713
F.2d 1487, 1489, 1493 (10th Cir. 1983); Traveler's Indem. Co. v. School Bd., 666 F.2d
505, 506-09 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F.2d
1071, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 1981); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund,
493 F.2d 177, 179-82 (Ist Cir. 1974).
144. See, e.g., Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1374, 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983); Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 612 F.2d 160,
162-65 (5th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980); Unified School Dist. v.
Epperson, 583 F.2d 1118, 1119, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 1978); Perez v. Rodriguez, 575 F.2d
21, 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1978); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961, 963,
966-68 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 133-38.
146. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court held that state
substantive law should be the governing law in diversity cases. Id. at 78-80. Although the
Court has since permitted Congress and the courts to formulate rules for diversity cases
that govern matters "falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure,"
the Court has reaffirmed that state law must govern issues that are " 'substantive' in every
traditional sense." See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965).
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court bias.' 47 Admittedly, this type of bias is especially acute when an
out-of-state citizen sues the state. Consequently, since an eleventh
amendment immunity for political subdivisions in diversity cases denies
out-of-state plaintiffs a federal forum, it is in conflict with the policy un-
derlying diversity jurisdiction.
The circumstances surrounding the passage of the eleventh amend-
ment, however, reveal that the diversity policies must yield. The elev-
enth amendment was adopted in response to a series of cases that were
brought against states under the state-citizen diversity clause of article
III.48 These cases posed two threats to state sovereignty. First, they
raised the potential for significant state financial liability.'49 Second, they
permitted federal judicial review of state policies on the sequestration of
Tory property and the disposition of public lands. 150 Clearly, these cases
presented a strong possibility of bias against the out-of-state plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, the eleventh amendment was intended to bar these ac-
tions.' Therefore, the adoption of the eleventh amendment indicates
147. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) ("'Diversity of citizenship juris-
diction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts
against those not citizens of the State.' ") (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
74 (1938)); Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 37, 50 (1809)
("However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as
impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true, that
the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national
tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citi-
zens of different states."); C. Wright, supra note 80, § 23 (citing fear of state court preju-
dice as the traditional justification and discussing other justifications); Note, The Historic
Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483, 492 (1928) (author: Judge Henry J.
Friendly).
148. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1974); Employees v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 291 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); C. Jacobs,
supra note 66, at 64-67; 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3524, at 118-19 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter Federal Practice and Procedure];
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1054-63; Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create
Causes of Action Against State Governments and The History of the Eleventh and Four-
teenth Amendments, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1413, 1430-31 (1975). State-citizen diversity ju-
risdiction refers to the jurisdictional grant contained in art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Fletcher,
supra note 11, at 1035. Prior to the passage of the eleventh amendment, seven state-
citizen diversity cases naming six states as defendants were before the Supreme Court.
See C. Jacobs, supra note 66, at 43. Two of these cases are unreported, and with the
exception of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 363 (1793), the reports of the others
are fragmentary. See C. Jacobs, supra note 66, at 43; see, eg., Vanstophorst v. Maryland,
2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 349 (1791) (order awarding commission to examine witnesses in Holland
conditioned on naming of commissioners). Professor Clyde Jacobs provides a detailed
secondary account of the factual setting and the legal issues involved in these cases. See
C. Jacobs, supra note 66, at 43-64.
149. See J. Goebel, 1 History of the Supreme Court of the United States 734 (1971); 1
C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 99 (rev. ed. 1932); Nowak,
supra note 148, at 1434.
150. See C. Jacobs, supra note 66, at 70-71; Gibbons, supra note 100, at 1920-23; No-
wak, supra note 148, at 1434, 1437-1441.
151. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660-63 (1974); Employees v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 291 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); C. Jacobs,
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that the need to protect state funds and state policies from federal judi-
cial interference outweighs the need for an impartial forum in diversity
cases.
Political subdivisions often may receive significant state funding and
frequently may carry out important state policies. 52 Moreover, they are
charged with the responsibility of a sovereign state for purposes of the
state action doctrine.' 53 Nevertheless, political subdivisions receive no
eleventh amendment protection. 54 This denial of eleventh amendment
protection is justified in federal question cases by the need to enforce
federally protected rights. 55 However, by allowing a political subdivi-
sion to be sued in diversity on the same showing as when federal ques-
tions are at issue, the courts undermine the delicate balance of state and
federal interests that the eleventh amendment achieves. Consequently,
political subdivisions should be entitled to eleventh amendment immu-
nity in diversity cases, and the courts should dismiss diversity suits
brought against state or local governmental entities without reaching the
question of whether the entity is a political subdivision or an arm of the
state.
To implement this proposed revision it is necessary to modify the
Mount Healthy-Lake Country test for eleventh amendment immunity.
As the law currently stands, the threshold question in determining the
eleventh amendment immunity of a governmental entity is whether the
entity is an arm of the state or a political subdivision. 56 Under the rein-
terpretation proposed in this Note, the threshold question should be
whether the basis of jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship or federal ques-
tion. If jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship, the entity
should generally receive eleventh amendment protection and the case
should be dismissed.1 57 If, on the other hand, the basis of jurisdiction is
federal question, the Mount Healthy-Lake Country balancing test should
apply. When the balancing test reveals that the entity is an arm of the
supra note 66, at 64-67; Federal Practice and Procedure, supra note 148, at 118-19;
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1054-63; Nowak, supra note 148, at 1430-3 1.
152. See supra notes 28-54 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 133-38.
156. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
157. Political subdivisions generally receive some state funding and are normally sub-
ject to some state control. See supra notes 28-55 and accompanying text. It would be
unwise, however, to state an overly rigid rule. A court might someday confront a govern-
mental entity that does not receive any state funding and is not subject to any state con-
trol. In such a case it might be wise to create an exception to the proposed blanket
immunity for governmental entities sued in diversity. Even in this extreme case, how-
ever, there are two considerations weighing in favor of eleventh amendment protection.
First, the entity would still be considered a state actor for purposes of the contracts
clause, the equal protection clause, the due process clause and the Bill of Rights as incor-
porated through the fourteenth amendment. See supra notes 56-60. Second, in perform-
ing a local governmental function the governmental entity exercises state powers. See
supra note 55.
[Vol. 55
1986] ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
state, the entity should receive eleventh amendment protection.'5 8 How-
ever, when the balancing test reveals that the entity is a political subdivi-
sion, the eleventh amendment should not bar the exercise of federal
jurisdiction. ' 9
Although Lincoln County represents precedent to the contrary, it was
decided while eleventh amendment doctrine was in its infancy."eo Thus
it predates the modem understanding of the federalism principles that
govern exceptions to eleventh amendment immunity. 61 Moreover, Lin-
coln County provides no compelling reason for denying political subdivi-
sions eleventh amendment immunity in diversity cases. The Lincoln
County Court relied primarily on the County's status as a corporation. 6 2
While incorporation may have indicated independence in 1890, today,
agencies that are clearly state instrumentalities are nevertheless incorpo-
rated.163 Furthermore, the modem Supreme Court test of political sub-
division status has never considered incorporation a relevant criterion.'64
Indeed, the Court recently held that the eleventh amendment bars a suit
against a state corporate agency. 65 In sum, Lincoln County presents no
serious obstacle to a reinterpretation of the arm of the state doctrine.
There is a related line of Supreme Court cases which hold that political
subdivisions are citizens of the state for diversity purposes. 16 6 Although
the test for citizenship is similar to the test for eleventh amendment im-
munity, 167 the Supreme Court's citizenship opinions have not addressed
158. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
159. See id.
160. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890), was decided ninety-two years
after the adoption of the eleventh amendment, and eighteen years before Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
161. See supra notes 62-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federalism
principles underlying the exceptions to the eleventh amendment.
162. 133 U.S. at 530.
163. See Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d 730,
732-34 (1lth Cir. 1984); Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1522
(11 th Cir. 1983); Korgich v. Regents of N.M. School of Mines, 582 F.2d 549, 551 (10th
Cir. 1978); Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 37-38 (2d Cir.
1977); Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166, 1174-76 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
910 (1977); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177, 178,
182 (lst Cir. 1974); Tardan v. Chevron Oil, 463 F.2d 651, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1972); Bren-
nan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287, 1290-91 (10th Cir. 1971).
164. See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
165. See Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450
U.S. 147, 149-50 (1981) (per curiam).
166. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-18 (1973); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1972); Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118,
121-22 (1868).
167. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21 (1973); Jacintoport Corp.
v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 437 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986); Adden v. Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.
1982). The test for whether a governmental entity is a citizen of the state considers the
following factors: (1) whether the entity exercises corporate powers; (2) whether the en-
tity has the power to levy taxes to pay adverse judgments; (3) whether the entity has the
power to issue bonds and whether those bonds create an obligation on the part of the
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the eleventh amendment question. 168 Therefore the citizenship cases do
not impede a reinterpretation of the eleventh amendment immunity of
political subdivisions. 169
An immunity for political subdivisions in diversity cases does not
render this citizenship principle obsolete. Although political subdivi-
sions exhibit characteristics of states, they are also distinct from the state
in certain ways. 170 When a political subdivision is sued in diversity with-
out the consent of the state, it is appropriate to give recognition to the
political subdivision's embodiment of state sovereignty by extending elev-
enth amendment protection. Naturally, the ultimate purpose of an im-
munity for political subdivisions is to protect the state. Hence, the state
should have the power to waive the political subdivision's immunity.
When a state waives a political subdivision's immunity there is no in-
fringement on state sovereignty, and therefore, there is no reason to em-
phasize the subdivision's state characteristics. Consequently, in the event
of a waiver it will be appropriate to treat a political subdivision as a citi-
zen for diversity purposes.
The analysis of eleventh amendment immunity in cases based solely on
diversity is equally applicable to pendent and ancillary state claims raised
in federal question cases. Federalism considerations require that the
eleventh amendment bar actions against political subdivisions based on
state law claims that are pendent or ancillary to a valid federal law
claim. 17' Federal jurisdiction in these cases is based on considerations of
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.' 72 The Supreme
Court has held that these policy considerations cannot override the elev-
state; and (4) the status of the entity under state law. See Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693, 719-21 (1973).
168. See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-22 (1973); Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-98 (1972); Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 118, 121-22 (1868).
169. Cf. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 (1984)
(" '[When questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio,
this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us.' ") (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5
(1974)); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974) (previous opinions on eleventh
amendment issues not an obstacle to reinterpretation when they did not contain any sub-
stantive analysis).
170. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
171. Cf County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 251 (1985) (elev-
enth amendment bars action against state predicated on ancillary jurisdiction); Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119-23 (1984) ( eleventh amendment
bars action against state predicated on pendent jurisdiction).
172. United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Nelson v. Greater Gads-
den Hous. Auth., No. 85-7320, slip op. at 134 (1 1th Cir. Oct. 17, 1986); Jones v. Inter-
mountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 551-53 (10th Cir. 1986); Province v. Cleveland
Press, 787 F.2d 1047, 1054-55 (6th Cir. 1986); Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
698 F.2d 1295, 1320 (5th Cir. 1983); Appelbaum v. Ceres Land Co., 687 F.2d 261, 262
(8th Cir. 1982); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 772 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
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enth amendment. 173 Moreover, plaintiffs do not need pendent and ancil-
lary jurisdiction to assure a federal forum for their federal claims because
they can split their claims between federal and state court, or can choose
to forego their state claims.' 7 4 Hence, federal jurisdiction over pendent
or ancillary state claims is not necessary to vindicate federally protected
rights. Nevertheless, federal jurisdiction over pendent or ancillary state
claims infringes on state sovereignty to the same degree as federal juris-
diction over state claims based solely on diversity.
CONCLUSION
Although political subdivisions are independent from the state in cer-
tain respects, they nevertheless exercise a part of the state's sovereign
power. Political subdivisions have no eleventh amendment protection
even though they may receive significant state funding and may be sub-
ject to state supervision of policy. Furthermore, political subdivisions are
charged with the responsibilities of a sovereign state for purposes of the
state action doctrine. Thus, suits brought against political subdivisions in
federal court do offend the state's sovereignty, even though such suits fall
within a clearly established exception to the eleventh amendment.
Recent Supreme Court cases indicate that the other exceptions to the
eleventh amendment are narrowly tailored to insure the vindication of
federal rights with minimal infringement on the state's sovereignty. In
keeping with this principle, the Supreme Court has limited the exception
encompassed by the Ex parte Young doctrine to suits involving questions
of federal law. The arm of the state doctrine also should be narrowly
tailored. Accordingly, political subdivisions should receive eleventh
173. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123 (1984).
174. See id. at 122. If plaintiffs split their state and federal claims between state and
federal courts respectively, the state court may enter judgment first. In this situation
principles of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) may
bar the plaintiffs from litigating their federal claims. See generally R. Smith, Pennhurst v.
Halderman: The Eleventh Amendment, Erie and Pendent State Law Claims, 34 Buffalo
L. Rev. 227, 275-81 (1985) (discussing the effect of a state court judgment on a pending
federal proceeding if plaintiffs follow Pennhurst and split their claims between federal and
state courts). Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits precludes the parties
from stating claims in a second proceeding that were raised in the prior proceeding. Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Under collateral estoppel, a decision on an issue of
law or fact may preclude a party to the action who has had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue from relitigating that issue in a second suit. Id. at 94-95. These rules
apply even when the first proceeding is in state court and the second proceeding is in
federal court. Id. at 94-96.
Res judicata and collateral estoppel apply with equal force in section 1983 actions. See
Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75, 83-85 (1984) (res judicata); Allen, 449
U.S. at 103-04 (collateral estoppel). Thus a prior state court judgment could prevent a
plaintiff who has split his claims from enforcing his federal rights. Nevertheless, a plaintiff
can avoid this consequence and assure a federal forum for the enforcement of his federal
rights by proceeding first with the federal claim in federal court, see Migra, 465 U.S. at
84-85 & n.7, or by foregoing his state claim entirely, see Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).
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amendment protection from actions that do not raise substantive ques-
tions of federal law.
Anthony . Harwood
